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In 2004, the United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change released its key report on contemporary international 
collective security, A More Secure World:  A Shared Responsibility.1  The Report 
emphasised the importance of the international legal order in a new security 
paradigm of global insecurities, interdependence, and responsibilities.  For the 
Panel, the authority of the international community derived from the agreement of 
its members to be bound by international legal rules rather than upon its coercive 
powers.  Accordingly, A More Secure World characterised effective international 
governance as resting upon legal legitimacy rather than coercive force. 
However, the Report also acknowledged that ‘[t]he effectiveness of the global 
collective security system, as with any other legal order, depends ultimately not only 
on the legality of decisions but also on the common perception of their legitimacy - 
their being made on solid evidentiary grounds, and for the right reasons, morally as 
well as legally’.2  The Report identified the legitimacy of the international 
community as being most problematic where its decisions concern ‘large-scale life 
and death impact’.3  It contended that the ‘question of legality’ and the ‘question of 
legitimacy’ became particularly problematic in relation to the regulation of violence 
in the international system.  Throughout the Report, the relationship between 
legality and legitimacy became a clearly paradoxical problem in relation to the 
international legal regulation of violence.  On the one hand, the legitimacy of law 
founds the regulation of violence in the international system, since the agreement to 
be bound by an international legal order is the basis of international collective 
security.  However, that violence also undermines legal legitimacy as a foundation 
of a rightful international order, as force uncouples the presumption that legality 
provides legitimation.  
This problematic relationship between legality and legitimacy in A More Secure 
World suggests that older juridical models of legal legitimacy may no longer be 
useful for understanding the international legal regulation of conflict in new global 
orders.  This paper explores how the undoing and remaking of law, sovereignty, and 
community in globalisation produces a form of juridical relations that is not 
reducible to the legitimation of rule.  It argues that this legal form expresses the new 
social associations of globalisation as legal relations.  Those legal relations 
reconstitute these new forms of social relations as global, and thus themselves 
 
1 United Nations, A More Secure World:  Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-
General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change.  
2 United Nations, A More Secure World, para. 204. 
3United Nations, A More Secure World, para. 205. 
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become an integral part of the process of globalisation. 
 
Reading the laws of Violence 
 
i. The question of legitimacy 
 
How, then, should we analyse the contemporary international legal regulation of 
conflict?  Uwe Ewald identifies two key approaches to understanding globalisation 
and the international legal regulation of conflict, which he describes as ‘universal 
protection vs. interest-related risk management’.4 These models are perhaps better 
described more broadly as cosmopolitan governance, exemplified by the work of 
David Held, or imperial rule, most often identified with the work of Hardt and Negri 
(as Ewald does).  Importantly, Ewald notes that ‘the common point of departure for 
both concepts is an awareness of a new age of global risks and a different form of 
war which results in a new concept of security, which is, at the outset, confronted by 
a lack of legitimacy in the use of international and national state violence’.5 Both 
these approaches claim that there is a ‘legitimation crisis’ concerning the 
international governance of coercive power.  For example, Held argues that new 
global insecurities require new forms of legitimate international governance, while 
Hardt and Negri contend that the international law no longer functions as the basis 
of legitimate violence in the general global state of war.6  Yet while both paradigms 
insist upon the absence of legal legitimacy in the new global disorder, at the same 
time they also insist upon the necessity of the legal legitimation of the new global 
order.  For example, Held characterises international law as the legitimate 
foundation of ‘cosmopolitan social democracy’.7  In contrast, Hardt and Negri reject 
‘liberal cosmopolitan arguments’ and argue instead that international law serves to 
legitimate imperial rule.  Common to both arguments is the idea that law also 
operates as a legitimating form of rule, which permits the exercise of power without 
coercive force.  These models of cosmopolitan governance and imperial rule thus 
reiterate the same paradoxical relationship between legality and legitimacy in the 
international relation of violence that can be found in the Report.  On the one hand, 
there is a crisis of legal legitimacy concerning the regulation of violence.  On the 
other hand, the legitimacy of law is also the basis of the international regulation of 
violence.   
Martii Koskenniemi argues that ‘the structure of international legal 
argumentation’ constantly moves between concreteness and normativity, or between 
apology and utopia.  For Koskenniemi, this structure of argumentation entails that 
international law ‘remains both over- and underlegitimizing:  it is overlegitimizing 
 
4 Ewald, Large-Scale Victimisation and the Jurisprudence of the ICTY, p.177. 
5 Ewald, Large-Scale Victimisation and the Jurisprudence of the ICTY, p.177. 
6 Held/McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization, pp. 223-4; Hardt/Negri, Multitude, pp. 29-30. 
7 Held/McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization, pp 218-219, 224; Hardt/Negri, Multitude, pp. 
234, 277. 
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as it can be ultimately invoked to justify any behaviour (apologism), it is 
underlegitimizing because it is incapable of providing any convincing argument on 
the legitimacy of any practices (utopianism)’.8  These models of the international 
regulation of armed conflict repeat this structure of international legal 
argumentation.  In what we can call the ‘apologist’ account of imperial rule, 
international law reflects relations of force, and hence derives its efficacy from 
force.  In the ‘utopian’ model of cosmopolitan governance, international law reflects 
ethical values, and so derives its power from morality.  In both models, international 
law can affect social action only insofar as it functions as the legitimation of force or 
legitimating ideal. However, if law only has effect as legitimated force or normative 
legitimacy, then how do we explain the role of law in the international system?  This 
formulation leaves unanswered the question of how international law has efficacy or 
effect as law.  These arguments do not explain how law functions as a constitutive 
element of the global order as than as a form of the legitimation of rule. 
However, the ongoing undoing and remaking of law, sovereignty, and community 
in the processes of globalisation suggests that it is necessary to move away from this 
older juridical model of legal legitimacy in order to understand the current 
international legal regulation of conflict.  The notion of legitimacy has an intimate 
philological relationship to the notion of legality because its connected meanings of 
lawful filiation and power derive from its common etymological Latin root, legis.  If 
the first sense refers to lawful belonging to family and community, the second sense 
refers to the lawful power of the sovereign.  The concept of legitimacy uses law to 
bind both sovereign rule and community membership.  However, the 
etynomologically intimate relation between the legal and the legitimate points to the 
emergence of this notion from the older form of rule that Foucault characterises as 
the ‘juridical monarchy’, in which the political order is founded upon the lawful 
exercise of sovereign rule over a community.9  If there has been an uncoupling of 
older forms of legality and legitimacy in current global insecurities and 
interdependences, then it is necessary to develop a model of law that does not reduce 
law to legitimacy.  Instead, we require a new way to understand international 
legality that can address the specificity and efficacy of the legal in the new global 
world, and the constitutive power of legality in the making of this world. 
 
ii. The problem of legality 
 
Both cosmopolitan governance and imperial rule arguments understand 
humanitarian law as symptomatic of new global dis/orders, whether functioning to 
found global governance, or to ‘neutralize and pacify conflict’ in a state of global 
war.10  In these symptomatic readings, law reproduces broader global structures.  
However, these approaches fail to address law ‘in its specificity as a historical 
practice which operates through particular forms and mechanisms which are real, 
 
8 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p. 67. 
9 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I, p. 89. 
10 Held/McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization, p. 224; Hardt/Negri, Multitude, p. 276.  
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effective and differentiated, and which are related to irreducible to broader social 
relations’.11  In particular, neither of these accounts explains why the regulation of 
international violence should necessarily take a legal form.  There are clearly many 
forms of global ordering.  However, the international community seeks to regulate 
armed conflict in terms of law.  China Miéville describes this as the ‘basic 
ontological question’:  ‘why law?’.  Miéville suggests that there is ‘something in the 
structure of the modern social relations which maintains the integrity of the 
peculiarly legal form of conceptualising and articulating claims’.12  In the global 
context, we need to ask:  why do these social relations take the form of legal 
relations?  And what legal form do these global relations take?  
 
iii. The laws of war 
 
If the use of violence at the international level is legally regulated by the jus ad 
bellum (the rules governing the resort to force), and the jus in bello (the rules 
governing the conduct of conflict, or international humanitarian law (‘IHL’), only 
certain breaches of these rules are criminalised under international law.  These so-
called ‘core crimes’ are war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.  With 
the important exception of crimes against peace, a criminal breach of the jus ad 
bellum, these crimes are violations of international humanitarian law.13  These 
crimes form the subject-matter of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
and the International Criminal Court, the leading international criminal bodies 
having jurisdiction at the international level, and give rise to universal jurisdiction at 
the level of the state. They are typically considered to be ‘the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole’ (Article 5, ICC Statute).   
Popovski and Turner describe how ‘the recourse to the use of force [the jus ad 
bellum] has an exceptional and controversial character and is the most critical 
domain of international relations in need of robust legality and legitimacy’.14   The 
body of rules regulating the use of force, then, clearly reveals the crisis in older 
juridical models of legal legitimacy at the international level.  However, they do not 
reveal the new forms of legality that are emerging in their place.  By contrast, the 
body of rules regulating the conduct of conflict are rapidly proliferating, 
increasingly enforced, and increasingly significant.  For these reasons, IHL is a 
better example of the global remaking of legality at the international level.  Rather 
 
11  Norrie, Law and the Beautiful Soul, p. 30. 
12 Miéville, Between Equal Rights, p. 43. 
13 While crimes against peace, or the crime of aggression, are international crimes under 
customary law, this crime has not been prosecuted since 1947.  While its modern incarnation can be 
found in the ICC Statute, the Court only has jurisdiction once the crime has been defined and its 
scope agreed, an issue which was not formally considered until July 2009; see Schabas, An 
Introduction to the International Criminal Court, pp. 31-34.  Moreover, even when the crime comes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court, it is likely to be severely restricted through regulation by the 
Security Council:  Zolo, Who Is Afraid of Punishing Aggressors, p. 799.   
14 Popoviski/Turner, Legality and Legitimacy in the International order, p. 2. 
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than focusing my analysis upon the laws governing the resort to force, the most 
‘exceptional and controversial’ area of law regulating international violence, I will 
focus upon the least contested area, the laws governing the conduct of conflict.  In 
particular, I will focus upon those violations of IHL that are criminalised at the 
international level, namely, the international criminal law (‘ICL’) of the core crimes 
of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.15   
I use two analytic strategies to explore this international legal regulation of 
violence.  First, I develop the ‘methodology’ of the pre-eminent theorist of the legal 
form, Pashukanis, to analyse the legal subjects and relations of ICL, and hence to 
describe their juridical form.  My second strategy reads this early Marxist model of 
law together with Hardt and Negri’s injunction:  ‘to follow in Marx’s footsteps one 
must really walk beyond Marx and develop on the basis of his method a new 
theoretical apparatus adequate to our own present situation’.16  I read Pashukanis’ 
theory of the legal form with the accounts of contemporary forms of association 
offered by Latour and Hardt and Negri to describe the emergence of this new legal 
form of global relations.  This second strategy uses the specific example of the 
Yugoslavian wars of the 1990s, together with the institution and jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), to explore the 
emergence of this global legal form. 
 
Strategy one: The international legal form 
 
i. The methodology of the legal form 
 
Is it possible to understand law as a social relationship in the same 
sense in which Marx termed capital a social relationship?17  
 
Pashukanis aimed to understand law as a ‘historical form of regulation’ that emerged 
from the social relations of capitalism.18 To avoid both economist and idealist 
theories of law, Pashukanis’ ‘general theory of law’ develops what I shall call the 
‘methodology’ of the legal form, namely, a set of principles for undertaking an 
analysis of law as specific form of social relationships.19  In this methodology, an 
analysis of law should first identify ‘the basic juridic abstractions’ of juridical 
norms, subjects, and relations.20  These legal categories are the abstract expression 
of the fundamental elements of the legal form.  These ‘basic juridic abstractions […] 
 
15 For clarity regarding this distinction between the core crimes and the broader body of 
international humanitarian rules (which include rules whose breaches are not necessarily 
criminalized at the international level), I will use ‘IHL’ to refer to the broader body of international 
rules regulating the conduct of conflict, and ‘ICL’ to refer to the narrower category of international 
crimes. 
16 Hardt/Negri, Empire, p.  43. 
17 Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, p. 55. 
18 Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law, p. 154. 
19 See Pashukanis, Methods of Constructing the Concrete in the Abstract Sciences.  
20 Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, p. 43. 
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which are the closest definitions of the legal form, in general reflect specific and 
very complex social relations’.21  The second task of this legal theory, then, is to 
understand the relationship between this system of legal concepts and the concrete 
historical social relations from which they emerge. 
Pashukanis argues that in the legal form of social relations, atomistic legal 
subjects exist in juridical relations of exchange.  The legal form is a particular form 
of social relation, in which that relation takes the form of juridical obligations or 
entitlements of exchange between abstract, free, and equal subjects.22 Pashukanis 
argues that under certain historical conditions, namely, capitalist relations of 
exchange, ‘the regulation of social relationships assumes a legal character’.23  This 
legal form of the social relation reaches its highest level of abstraction in the 
commodity exchange of developed capitalism. 
 
ii. The legal form of international law 
 
In his earlier extended essay on international law of 1925, Pashukanis argues that the 
subject of international law is the state as the bearer of sovereign authority.  This 
abstract subject is able to enter into exchange with other states, which are understood 
as ‘individual property owners with equal rights’.  In this contractual relation, 
bourgeois states interact ‘on the basis of equivalent exchange, i.e. on a legal basis 
(on the basis of the mutual recognition of subjects)’.  However, like contractual 
relations in national legal systems, ‘bourgeois international law in principle 
recognises that states have equal rights yet in reality they are unequal in their 
significance and their power’.  Because of the absence of an organisational force 
able to coerce states to observe international legal norms, the only guarantee of these 
international legal relationships is ‘the real balance of forces’.24  For Pashukanis, 
‘modern international law is the legal form of the struggle of capitalist states among 
themselves for domination over the rest of the world’.25  In this formulation, the 
material conditions of the international legal form are the struggle between 
imperialist, capitalist states.  International law, then, is the legal form of the 
imperialist relation between capitalist states.   
For Pashukanis, the laws of war exemplify the legal form at an international level, 
because this body of law ‘assumes juridical equality and unequal violence’.26  At 
first reading, this analysis of contemporary ICL seems convincing for three reasons.  
First, ICL does appear to assume juridical equality between sovereign states, 
because these norms derive from treaty or custom, that is, from the express or tacit 
 
21 Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, p. 43. 
22 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p. 68. 
23 Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, p. 58. 
24 Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, pp. 176-179. 
25 Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, p. 169. 
26 Miéville, Between Equal Rights, pp. 136-7 and 292-293. 
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consent of states to be bound by these rules.27  Second, ICL also seems to reflect the 
principle of state sovereignty, as different rules and enforcement mechanisms apply 
to international or internal conflicts, and to state or non-state actors.  For example, 
the rules governing the conduct of international conflict between states are 
considerably more developed and restrictive than those of internal armed conflict, 
which has been considered as ‘an internal problem, governed by domestic law’.28  
Third, it appears that the ‘unequal violence’ of state interest and power shape both 
the norms of IHL and their enforcement.  For example, the principle of 
proportionality (that injury to civilians must not exceed military necessity) certainly 
reflects the military (and political) interests of states.29  Similarly, the international 
community rarely enforces these norms against its most powerful members, as 
exemplified by the recent antagonism of the USA towards the ICC.30 
However, as both cosmopolitan governance and imperial rule arguments 
concerning new forms of legal regulation of international violence suggest, these 
juridical categories are also undergoing an important shift.  This move is best 
summarised by the ICTY in the leading Tadic Jurisdiction Appeals Decision, which 
held that:  ‘[a] State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by 
a human-being-oriented approach.31  This shift can be seen in the ongoing 
reconstruction of the fundamental juridical categories of the legal subject and the 
juridical relation in contemporary ICL.  These new legal concepts are not fully 
developed, as this shift is not yet complete.32  Nevertheless, these changing juridical 
categories indicate a new global legal form, which is neither international nor 
national in scale.33  To understand the emergence of this new form of juridical 
relations, my analysis will use the ‘methodology’ of the legal form.  First, it will 
examine ‘the basic juridic abstractions’ of juridical norms, subjects, and relations.  
Second, it will analyse the relationship between this system of legal concepts and the 
concrete historical social relations from which they emerge. 
 
iii. The legal subject and the juridical relationship 
 
In his general theory of law, Pashukanis suggests that an analysis of the legal form 
should begin with the legal subject, which he describes as the ‘atom’ of the juridical 
relation.34  Moreover, the earliest and most obvious example of the changing 
 
27 Simma/Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts:  
A Positivist View, pp. 302, 305. 
28 Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, p. 215. 
29 Normand/Jochnick, The Legitimation of Violence:  A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, p. 387. 
30 Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony, p. 369. 
31 Tadic Jurisdiction Appeals Decision, para. 97. 
32 In this reading of the legal form, I am following Norrie (rather than Warrington’s) reading of 
Pashukanis’ general theory of law as offering the theoretical basis for the study of law in changing 
forms of capitalist society.  See Warrington Pashukanis and the Commodity Form Theory, pp. 1-
22, and Norrie, Pashukanis and the ‘Commodity Form Theory: a Reply to Warrington’, p. 419. 
33 I would like to thank Sari Wastell for this scalar point:  see her Scales of Justice.  
34 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p. 109. 
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categories of ICL can be seen in the concept of the legal subject.  From the 
Nuremburg Trials onwards, it is clear that international criminal liability is based 
upon the principle of the individual criminal responsibility of persons.35  Pashukanis 
points out that modern criminal law shifts from older forms of collective guilt to 
current forms of individual guilt.36  The refusal of notions of collective guilt found 
contemporary ICL jurisprudence and institutions, which focus upon the individual 
perpetrator.37  As Pashukanis suggests in relation to national criminal law, the legal 
subjects of ICL are ‘isolated egoistic subjects, the bearers of autonomous private 
interests’, subject to penal punishment equivalent to his or her crime.38  In 
contemporary ICL, as Pashukanis describes: ‘punishment functions as a settlement 
of accounts [in which] the notion of responsibility is indispensable.  The offender 
answers for his offence with his freedom, in fact with a portion of his freedom 
corresponding to the gravity of his action’.39 
In terms of the forms of criminal liability in ICL, the legal subject is not the 
autonomous sovereign state.  Instead, it is understood as the autonomous individual 
whose actions are abstracted from social relations and judged according to the legal 
norms of the ‘international community’.  While older models of the laws of war 
were based upon notions of contractual and reciprocal relationships between states, 
contemporary ICL is increasingly perceived as a set of universal rules applicable to 
all participants in conflict.40   This shift is most obviously seen in the norms of 
crimes against humanity and genocide, which all persons have an obligation to 
observe in all circumstances.  By contrast to other areas of international law, the 
contemporary legal subject of ICL is not the state, but the individual.  ICL 
transforms persons into legal subjects, by constructing them as individual actors who 
are subject to international criminal duties and sanctions.  
 
35 Nuremberg IMT, pp. 172, 221. Indeed, it remains a highly contentious issue as to whether states 
can be legal subjects of international criminal law, see Crawford, The International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, pp. 242-243. This issue should be distinguished 
from the obligations of states to punish breaches of humanitarian law, such as those arising under 
the Geneva Conventions, which constitute a system of enforcement rather than a system of criminal 
sanctions against states. 
36 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p. 167. 
37 For an important discussion of the relationship between individual and collective guilt, see 
Hirsh/Fine, Individual Responsibility and Cosmopolitan Law. 
38 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p. 188.  See Norrie, Pashukanis and the ‘Commodity Form 
Theory: a Reply to Warrington’ for an important defense of Pashukanis on criminal law. 
39 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p. 179.  Pashukanis goes on to argue that it is because of this 
principle that punishment must be equivalent to guilt that the principle of nullum crimen, nulla 
poena sine lege becomes an important legal norm, for the offender ‘must know in advance the 
conditions under which payment will be demanded of him’ (p. 184).  Indeed, breach of this 
principle is a common defense argument in cases before the ICTY. 
40 See Simpson, Law, War, and Crime, pp. 59-60 and Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian 
Law, pp. 239, 247-8.  While the distinction between the rules of international and internal conflict 
remains important, nevertheless the boundary between the two is increasingly blurred: Tadic 
Jurisdiction Appeals Decision, para. 97. See also Moir, Towards the Unification of International 
Humanitarian Law. 
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What, then, is the form of the juridical relation between these subjects of ICL?  
Given that the subject of ICL is not the state but the individual, it is not possible to 
simply read the juridical relation as taking the form of a contract between equal 
sovereign states.  Moreover, Pashukanis suggests that in the modern criminal law of 
the national state, the other party is neither the injured person nor the state, but rather 
‘the abstraction of the injured public interest’ that stands in for the injured person.41  
At the international level, it is also true that neither the injured person nor 
international community function as the legal subject.  How then might we 
understand the ‘abstraction of the injured public interest’ at the international level?  
What is the injury? And which public suffers injury?   
In normative terms, ICL no longer seeks to protect state interests as such but 
rather to protect humanity ‘as a collective’.42  This can be seen in the three core 
international crimes, from the ‘principles of humanity’ that are foundational to war 
crimes,43 to the characterisation of genocide as ‘a crime against all of humankind, its 
harm being felt […] by all of humanity’,44 to the crime against humanity, ‘a crime 
against the whole of mankind’.45  In all three crimes, ‘humanity’ functions as the 
‘abstraction of the injured public interest’.  Unlike international human rights law, 
the injury is not done to the individual person.  After all, international criminal law 
only protects certain persons, such as prisoners of war, members of ethnic groups, or 
civilians, and only in particular circumstances, such as armed conflict rather than 
civil disturbance.  It does not aim to protect all individuals at all times, and neither is 
it enforceable as an individual claim.  Rather, the injured public interest is the 
collective community of humanity.  For this reason, international criminal law 
prohibits this conduct as  ‘an attack on the legitimate interests which all states have 
in maintaining certain standards that are essential for the coexistence of all 
mankind’.46  The abstraction of the injured public interest thus shifts from being the 
protection of international society (understood as the mutual interests of the society 
of states), to being that of the community of humanity. 
These juridical relations reveal a shift from the legal form of the contract of 
exchange between states to the global relationship between persons.  The juridical 
relationship between these legal subjects is no longer simply based upon the ‘mutual 
recognition’ of states as subjects, but rather upon a more complex process of 
constituting persons in organised conflict as juridical subjects.  These juridical 
subjects exist in relations of legal equivalence because they are members of the 
collective community of humanity.  These shifts from state to individual 
responsibility, from the protection of state interest to the protection of humanity as 
such, and from the society of states to the global society of humanity, can be 
 
41 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p. 179. 
42 Teitel, Humanity’s Law, p. 355. 
43 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, paras. 78-79. 
44 The Prosecutor v. Krstic, para. 36. 
45 The Prosecutor v. Erdedmovic, para. 20-21. 
46 The Prosecutor v. Tadic, para. 40.  
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described as the emergence of a new global legal form.  The distinctive nature of this 
legal form does not lie solely in its constraint of coercive power, for it is part of the 
coercive relations of globalisation.  Nor does it simply lie in the normative 
recognition of our shared humanity, for this legal form does not recognise a prior 
and essential ‘humanity’.  Rather, the distinctive nature of this juridical relation lies 
in its constitution of ‘humanity’ as such. 
This global legal form is not mere a ‘lifeless abstraction’ that has no concrete 
existence.47  Rather, the emergence of this form of legal regulation of armed conflict 
can be seen at both national and international levels. This point should not be 
misunderstood as simply claiming that there is greater enforcement of these norms, 
which would lead to the familiar problem of the coercive power of international law.  
Instead, this argument follows Pashukanis in contending that coercion is not the 
foundation of the legal relation, but rather that it is the ordering of social relations 
that guarantees the existence of the legal form.48  While the operation of these norms 
at the international level at first appears to remain limited to either exceptional 
situations (such as the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR), or to state 
agreement, (exemplified by multilateral treaties such as the ICC Statute), these 
developments also suggest the increasing importance of this form of legal regulation 
of armed violence.  The establishment of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC exemplify the 
‘post-Cold War revival of international prosecutions’, after an interregnum of some 
fifty years.49  The legal mandate of the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals was 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, namely, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.  The power of the Security Council to establish 
international criminal tribunals (and to refer cases to the ICC) is now largely beyond 
dispute, and was used to refer the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC in 2005.50  
As John Bolton, a staunch critic of the ICC and of the Bush Administration’s ‘tacit 
support’ for its Darfur investigation, acknowledged that ‘[i]f you allow this to 
happen, you legitimize the ICC’.51  The ICC has secured significant international 
compliance, with 108 countries having ratified the Rome Statute as of January 2008.  
These developments suggest that this new legal form is currently emerging at the 
international level. 
At the national level, older implementation and compliance mechanisms, which 
range from the instruction of armed forces in humanitarian rules to the prosecution 
of its violations, are increasingly well established and widely accepted.52 There is 
also an ongoing increase in the exercise of universal jurisdiction, use of international 
 
47 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p. 85. 
48 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p. 89. 
49 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals, p. 11. 
50 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals, p. 53. 
51 Abramowitz/Lynch, Darfur Killings Soften Bush’s Opposition to International Court. 
52 Fleck, International Accountability for Violations of the Ius in Bello, p. 179.  See also the 
International Committee of the Red Cross National Implementation Data Base, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat. 
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criminal principles, and prosecution of crimes of war in national courts.53  Tribunals, 
which utilise a mixture of international and national elements to prosecute 
international crimes, have also been established in response to conflicts in Sierra 
Leone, Timor-Leste, and Cambodia.54  Finally, the wide ratification of the ICC 
Statute, and the concomitant obligation to prosecute breaches in national courts, 
entails that new national systems of compliance and enforcement of ICL are 
developing.55  What is emerging in these developments is an orientation to the 
‘global agendas and systems’ of this new legal form within national settings.56 
 
Strategy two: Towards a social theory of the global legal form 
 
i. From coercive power to relations of force 
 
Pashukanis suggests that the international legal form emerges from the concrete 
historical social relations of imperialist capitalism. This legal form derives from ‘a 
structured process of confrontation of international legal agents thrown up by the 
dynamics of capitalism’.57  Should we understand this global legal form as the legal 
expression of the new global imperialism?  If so, the work of Hardt and Negri would 
most obviously seem to offer a means to update Pashukanis’ analysis.  However, 
there are two key difficulties with such an appropriation.58   
The first difficulty is that is Hardt and Negri persuasively argue that the processes 
of globalisation do not simply produce a new form of imperialism.  Rather, these 
older imperialist forms have shifted to a new ‘global order, a new logic and structure 
of rule […] this new global form of sovereignty is what we call Empire’.59  Given 
this emphasis upon a new form of rule, we cannot simply substitute their account of 
global exchange for Pashukanis’ Leninist critique of imperialism in order to theorise 
ICL as the legal form of this new imperialist competition between states.60  The 
second difficulty concerns Hardt and Negri’s characterisation of ICL as a new mode 
of legal domination:  ‘postmodern global governance’.61  In this account, ICL is a 
 
53 See Human Rights Watch, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe; Sriram, Globalizing Justice for Mass 
Atrocities; and Ferdinandusse,  Direct Application of International Criminal Law in National 
Courts. 
54 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals. 
55 Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, p. 89. 
56 Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, p. 3. 
57 Miéville, Between Equal Rights, p. 280. 
58 Leaving aside the question of the accuracy of their descriptions of the ‘juridical concept of 
Empire’, which is raised by claims such as the ICTY does not apply either international or national 
law:  Hardt/Negri, Multitude, pp. 28-29. 
59 Hardt/Negri, Empire, pp. xi-xii. 
60 Hardt and Negri explicitly argue that while important, nevertheless Lenin’s analysis of 
imperialism does not explain this new global order, Hardt/Negri, Empire,  p. 234. 
61 Negri, Postmodern Global Governance and the Critical Legal Project, p. 27. 
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‘mechanism legitimating imperial authority’.62   In many respects, this analysis 
rearticulates the traditional realpolitik analysis of ICL in terms of the contemporary 
global moment.63  This older critical tradition argues that the international regulation 
of armed conflict legitimates the existing unequal relations of the international order 
by masking those inequalities through doctrines of state equality, and further makes 
conflict itself legitimate by giving it the mask of legality.  Hence this account returns 
us to the earlier theoretical problems of how to understand the contemporary forms 
of the international legal ordering of violence. 
If we return to Pashukanis’ account of the international legal form, then it is 
possible to find a more productive appropriation of Hardt and Negri for a theory of 
the global legal form.  Pashukanis argues that ‘in critical periods, when the balance 
of forces has fluctuated seriously […] the fate of the norms of the laws of war 
becomes extremely problematic’.64  Pashukanis understands the notion of ‘force’ 
here in terms of the coercive power of states at the international level.  However, I 
suggest that this claim becomes analytically very useful if it is re-read using a 
different paradigm of force.  Foucault argues that ‘war can be regarded as the point 
of maximum tension, or force-relations laid bare’.65  In Foucault, the notion of 
‘force’ refers to the ‘ability to affect and be affected’, so that force is always 
relational.  Violence is a ‘concomitant or consequence of force, but not a constituent 
element’.66  This approach enables us to understand the contemporary fluctuation of 
the ‘balance of forces’ not in terms of the coercive power of states, but in terms of 
the emergence of new relations of force in the processes of globalisation. 
To paraphrase Miéville, the global legal form can be understood as a structured 
process of the confrontation of legal agents thrown up by the dynamics of 
globalising capitalism.  Following Hardt and Negri, contemporary capitalism 
intensifies and amplifies the economic, political, and social exchanges of global 
exchange.67  While the very concept of ‘globalisation’ is highly contentious, 
nevertheless it captures the multiple processes involving dynamic and differential 
intensifications of transplanetary relations.68  In this sense, ‘globalisation’ does not 
indicate the emergence of a singular ‘global society’, in the sense of a bounded and 
homogenous structure.  Rather, it highlights the dynamic processes that make 
‘globalizing societies’, in the sense of the production of diffuse and differentiated 
interdependencies and interconnections.  This description of globalisation draws on 
Latour’s notion of the social as ‘association’.69  It emphasises the making of the 
‘social’, the constitution of relations, and the production of connections, and 
interactions.  In Latour’s terms, ‘the social […] is the name of a type of momentary 
 
62 Hardt/Negri, Empire, p. 38. 
63 Lippens, Tracing the Legal Boundary between Empire and Multitude, p. 389. 
64 Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, p. 179. 
65 Foucault, Society Must be Defended, p. 46. 
66 Deleuze, Foucault, p. 70. 
67 Hardt/Negri, Multitude, p. xiiii. 
68 Scholte Aart, Globalization: A Critical Introduction. 
69 Latour, Gabriel Tarde and the End of the Social. 
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association, which is characterised by the way it gathers together in new shapes’.70  
Framed through this understanding of the social as association, the forces of 
globalisation produce different forms of association, that is, new forms of relation.  
Globalisation is then understood as a set of processes that makes novel networks of 
associations, and hence constitutes new social relations.  The dynamic processes of 
these intensified and differentiated exchanges produce new associations that are both 
connective and conflictual.   
To understand the relation between these global associations and the global legal 
form, I focus upon the contemporary forms of association that sustain armed 
violence.  If we follow Foucault in understanding violence as a consequence of force 
rather than its constituent element, and war as ‘force-relations laid bare’, then armed 
violence becomes the ideal field to trace the new force-relations that emerge in the 
processes of globalisation.  My analysis of this field focuses upon conflict and 
connection as the two key forms of association that sustain war.  Globalisation 
produces new shapes of interaction and new forms of networks, of which some are 
antagonistic, coercive, and conflictual, and others are coalitional, affiliative, and 
connective.  I explore the operation of these conflictual and connective force-
relations through the example of the Yugoslavian wars of the 1990s and their legal 
regulation. 
Globalisation did not ‘create’ the Yugoslavian wars, or the legal regulation of its 
violences.  As Sassen points out, we should not understand globalisation in terms of 
a single causal model since to do so wrongly uses effect to explain cause.71  Rather, 
this analysis suggests that the dynamics of these forces of globalisation produced 
new forms of conflict and connection, which shaped the Yugoslavian conflict.  
Moreover, ‘the Yugoslavian wars’ were not a single moment of armed violence, but 
instead named a complex and prolonged state of conflicts and connections sustaining 
armed violence in the region of the former Yugoslavia.  As Clausewitz reminds us, 
war is a fundamentally social activity, and one that requires particular forms of 
associations to sustain it.  The processes of globalization traverse and shape these 
social relations of armed violence, just as they traverse and shape the formation of 
their international legal regulation. 
 
ii. The conflictual and connective associations of globalisation 
 
The new force-relations of globalisation produce new forms of conflictual 
association.  These conflicts are not the ‘new wars’ described by Kaldor and other 
writers, because they do not necessarily indicate new forms of war.72  Rather, they 
represent the emergence of new antagonisms, coercions, and violence in the uneven 
and differential processes of globalisation.  To illustrate the making of these new 
forms of conflictual association and their legal regulation, I focus upon two key 
force-relations of globalisation:  the political and the economic. 
 
70 Latour, Reassembling the Social, p. 65. 
71 Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights. 
72 Newman, The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed, pp. 173, 189. 
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A key new force-relation is the emergence of new political forms in the making of 
the post-Cold War world.  For example, the declining legitimacy of communist rule 
and the impact of democratisation exposed ‘the conflicting political forces in 
Yugoslav society’ that subsequently erupted into armed violence.73  The collapse of 
the Cold War system at the international level also facilitated the legal regulation of 
the Yugoslavian wars.  United Nations consensus regarding the international 
prosecutions of war crimes in the Yugoslavian conflict would not have been possible 
without the collapse of older Cold War power blocs.74  A second key force-relation 
of globalisation in the production of conflictual associations is economic.  
Sometimes called ‘negative globalisation’, the economic forces of global exchange 
have particular and differential impacts upon existing social and political orders.75  
For example, economic globalisation had crucial political effects in the emergence 
of war in the former Yugoslavia, since the declining legitimacy of the communist 
state was combined with a severe economic crisis due to the ‘structural adjustment’ 
programme of the International Monetary Fund.76  Equally, economic globalisation 
has also shaped the model and implementation of international post-conflict justice, 
such as the linking international criminal trials to state reconstruction, and state 
reconstruction to functional free-market states.77 
The global restructuring of older political and economic orders also produces new 
conflicts. These processes include the rearticulation of older territories of empire 
through new global relations.78  For example, Zolo reminds us that the history of 
earlier Ottoman and European empires shaped the modern Yugoslavia, from the 
great powers carving up the collapsed Ottoman Empire to the German and Italian 
occupations of World War Two.79  New global relations rearticulate these older 
orders, from the mobilisation of regional ethno-nationalist identity in the conflict to 
Western European myths of archaic ‘Balkan’ hatreds to justify non-intervention.  
However, new global orders also reshape these older patterns of association.  In the 
Yugoslavian case, this is most evident in American and European Union 
intervention in the conflict.80  This reshaping includes the remaking of existing legal 
orders.81  For example, the European and American engagement with the region 
framed the making of ‘Balkan’ transitional justice, ranging from crucial American 
support for the establishment of the ICTY to subsequent European Union support for 
national war crimes prosecutions (most notably in Bosnia). 
These global processes not only produce new conflicts, but also new connections.  
 
73 Hirst, War and Power in the 21st Century, p. 83. 
74 Cassese, International Criminal Law, pp. 726-727. 
75 Conteh-Morgan, Globalization, State Failure, and Collective Violence, p. 88. 
76 Woodward, Violence-Prone Area or International Transition? Adding the Role of Outsiders in 
Balkan Violence.  
77 Sriram, Liberal Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice, p. 579.  This link is most evident in EU 
and US policies in this area in Bosnia. 
78 Ahluwalia, Empire or Imperialism, p. 629. 
79 Zolo, Invoking Humanity. 
80 Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia. 
81 Randeria, De-Politicization of Democracy and Judicialization of Politics, p. 38. 
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They produce different transnational networks, which move through both national 
and international orders.  These global processes form new forms of affiliation.  For 
example, political and military actors in the Bosnian conflict sought to produce new 
forms of ethnic association, which were in turn instantiated by the Dayton settlement 
brokered by the international community.82 Global networks also traverse 
contemporary conflicts.  In the case of the Yugoslavian conflict, these networks 
included coverage by the international media, alliances between international and 
national NGOs, and the international flows of fighters, arms, and funds that 
sustained the conflict itself.83  The legal field of international criminal justice also 
emerges from these intensified global connections.  In the case of the ICTY, these 
associations ranged from transnational political networks, such as the non-
governmental organisations that campaigned for war crimes prosecutions,84 to 
religious affiliations, such as the pressure from the Islamic Conference Organisation 
for protection of Bosnian Muslims and the subsequent significant funding for the 
ICTY by leading Muslim countries, such as Malaysia and Pakistan.85  They also 
included communication networks, such as the importance of global information 
circuits such as CNN and the internet in building European and American public 
pressure for action.86 
 
The global legal form 
 
i. Law as association 
 
These new forms of global association, these new conflicts and connections that 
emerge in the processes of globalisation, are the material conditions that produce the 
emergent global legal form of ICL.  It is not that the case that the ‘concrete totality’ 
of globalisation produces the global legal form.  Rather, it is the ‘“rich totality of 
many determinations and relations’” (pace Marx) that produces this juridical 
relation.87  ICL expresses these dynamic and differential intensifications of 
globalisation in legal form.  ICL can thus be understood as the legal form of these 
emergent force-relations, in that it expresses these global relations as juridical 
relations.   
The global legal form is a specific form of association.  It works to ‘associate 
entities in a legal way’, that is, through particular material and symbolic legal 
practices that organise relations and connections.88  It is this shaping of social 
relations that gives the global legal form its constitutive power.  The global legal 
 
82 Abazovic, Bosnia and Herzegovina:  Ten Years After Dayton, p. 195. 
83 Kaldor, New and Old Wars. 
84 Hagan/Levi, Crimes of War and the Force of Law, p. 1499. 
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88 Latour, Reassembling the Social, p. 239.  See also Levi/Valverde, Studying Law by Association, 
pp. 805, 807. 
16 
form is neither antecedent nor posterior to the globalisations of social exchange.  
Rather, ‘the juridical moment […] is a constitutive part of it’.89  The new global 
legal form of ICL is a constitutive part of globalisation because it functions as a new 
legal form of association.  This legal association constitutes persons as global legal 
subjects, who have legal relationships to other legal subjects as members of 
‘humanity’.  ICL constitutes all persons as legal subjects, and constructs their 
associations in juridical terms. 
This legal form constitutes these new associations as global.  Douzinas argues that 
‘[h]uman rights construct humans.  I am human because the other recognises me as 
human which, in institutional terms, means as a bearer of human rights’.90  
Similarly, the legal form of ICL constructs persons as existing within global legal 
relations to other persons, and its object of protection as the global community of all 
persons, ‘humanity’ itself.  This representation of global social relations is 
performative in the Austinian sense.  This legal form creates the object it names, 
‘humanity’, and its juridical field instantiates this global signifier.  Following 
Pashukanis, this performativity is not simply in the realm of ideas or at the level of 
ideology.  Rather, the global legal form orders existing social relations through the 
production of new forms of global legal association.  This juridical relation 
constructs these emergent relations of social exchange not as particular, but as 
global.  For this reason, the global legal form is a constituent part of the processes of 
globalisation. 
 
ii. The problem of the global legal form 
 
Hardt and Negri suggest that Pashukanis saw the possibility of ‘transforming public 
law into an institutional system based on the common’.91  They contend that the 
global common is ‘the only basis upon which law can construct social relationships 
in line with the networks organised by the many singularities that create our new 
global reality’.92  However, Hardt and Negri ignore the theoretical problem for 
which Stalin ostensibly ‘liquidated’ Pashukanis:  namely, that capitalist social 
relations produce the legal form, and hence the revolutionary transformation of those 
social relations will entail the withering away of law.  Their call for new global 
rights as an institutional system based on the common ignores this problem of 
revolutionary law.  Moreover, the global legal form reflects the many singularities 
that create our new global reality, which are both conflictual and connective.  
International criminal law seeks to protect ‘humanity’ in war, rather than the utopian 
peace of the common.  For this reason, the production of ‘humanity’ by the global 
legal form should not be misunderstood as the recognition of the commonality of 
humans, as that which unites all person in a global community.  Nor can it be 
understood as capturing the essence of humanity or the quality of being human.  
 
89 Norrie, Pashukanis and the Commodity Form Theory, pp. 419, 423. 
90 Douzinas, The End of Human Rights, p. 317. 
91 Hardt/Negri, Multitude, p. 253. 
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Rather, the global legal form emerges from both the destructive and productive 
associations of global social exchange.   
The juridical relation of the global legal form produces ‘humanity’.  For this 
reason, it functions as a constituent element of the making of persons as members of 
the global community of humanity.  ICL does not simply reflect an already existing 
humanist category of our common humanity, but rather forms a juridical relation 
between all persons as members of humanity.  ICL therefore needs to be understood 
as those legal regulations without which ‘global humanity’ cannot be constituted. 
ICL constitutes ‘humanity’ by determining the legality of the new associations 
emerging from globalisation.  The global legal form sustains ‘global humanity’, for 
those legal relations ‘are essential for the coexistence of all mankind […] humanity 
at large cannot hold together without adherence to the standards in question’.93  The 
norms and practices of ICL determine the conduct that destroys or sustains the 
category of ‘humanity’ by judging the legality or illegality of certain forms of 
association in armed conflict.  ICL protects certain categories of person, such as 
civilians, the wounded, and non-combatants, from armed violence.  It prohibits 
certain aims of warfare, such as genocide.  It bars certain forms of armed violence, 
such as those causing ‘unnecessary suffering’.  ICL does not prohibit war as such, 
but only particular objects, aims, and forms of war.  These rules prohibit those forms 
of associations that would make the juridical category of ‘global humanity’ 
impossible.  They sustain ‘global humanity’ by prohibiting those associations that 
prevent the construction of the legal relation as global, that is, the formation of 
‘humanity’ itself. 
The global legal form of ICL actively shapes the transnational extension of the 
social by symbolising relations between persons as global.  Koskenniemi reminds us 
that ‘[i]nternational law may act precisely as the instrument through which particular 
grievances may be heard as universal ones and in this way, like myth, construct a 
sense of universal humanity through the act of invoking it’.94  The global legal form 
acts as the instrument through which particular grievances are heard as global 
claims. The legal relationship that constitutes persons as legal subjects existing in 
juridical relationship founds this order.  It constructs the possibility of global 
humanity, extracting persons from their particular social relations and remaking 
them as global legal subjects with juridical relations to humanity as such.  
The problem of the global legal form is not therefore, not legitimacy, but legality.  
Legitimacy does not sustain the global legal form, since this legal form is a 
constitutive part of the making of the global world.  It is not legitimacy that 
constructs social associations as global, but rather the legal form that constructs the 
global as a juridical relation.  The global legal form constitutes force relations as 
legal relations, humanity as a legal subject, and the associations between its 
members as a legal relation.  For this reason, the political challenge of the global 
legal form is not reducible to the creation of a more legitimate order of legal rules.  
Rather, the challenge is to create a new concept of legality itself, a task that requires 
 
93 Tadic Judgement in Sentencing Appeals, para. 40.  
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that requires the production of new legal forms that can symbolize just juridical 
relationships and global humanities. 
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